ADR-0032 - RAW / source protection v1¶
Status: ACCEPTED
Date: 2026-09-17
Context¶
DG-H operational safety needed a way to answer one question before any tier-relocation, backup/restore or retention/deletion authority (K07-K09) could be built on top of it: is the bounded set of source evidence required to reproduce one declared canonical source-acquired result present, content-verified and complete right now? K05 already supplies pressure observation; K06 needed to turn that into a protection decision without becoming a second identity system or a filesystem crawler.
Credited compatibility evidence:
- K05 pressure policy already reports thresholds/time-to-full/restrictions from observed capacity, independently of protection semantics.
- A03/A08 already establish source-acquired lineage and S13 certification evidence for canonical results.
- Package-boundary rule (
quant_platform.operationsmay depend only onoperations/sharedowners):quant_platform.operations.protectionmust not importquant_platform.source_adaptersor reach into a filesystem.
Decision¶
Adopt K06 RAW/source protection v1 as a pure protection-identity and
assessment seam under quant_platform.operations.protection.
Protection is a reconstruction claim, not a path claim: K06 proves whether caller-supplied evidence is sufficient to reconstruct one declared result, never crawls storage, watches for changes, copies bytes, schedules work or authorizes deletion itself.
Canonical fail-closed states (ProtectionState):
UNAVAILABLE, CORRUPT and LOST never normalize to PROTECTED or
AT_RISK; AT_RISK only ever applies when every artifact independently
verified. Every derived/computed field is recomputed by its owning
__post_init__ from already-validated inputs and cross-bound to the exact
object it describes (ProtectionUnitIdentity, PressureDecision) rather
than trusted from a caller-supplied bare state/decision string: a frozen
dataclass keeps a value from being mutated, not from being wrong at
construction, so validity comes from recomputation and cross-binding.
Attributable-evidence principle (SafetyRelevanceAssertion)¶
K06 cannot independently derive "is this write protecting unique,
non-reconstructible source evidence" from pressure evidence alone -- that
question is inherent to what the write is for, not to available bytes,
and quant_platform.operations has no source/authority registry to answer
it from. Rather than accept a bare unattributed boolean, SafetyRelevanceAssertion
binds the claim to an explicit accountable authority id, an explicit
instant, a rationale, and -- critically -- to the exact
ProtectionWriteAction (unit and bounded write size) it is about, so a
safety claim for one action can never be reused, whole or understated, to
authorize a differently sized or unrelated write. This is a general pattern,
not a K06-specific trick: a bounded package that cannot independently
verify a claim about external state must not implement a self-referential
check comparing caller-supplied data against other caller-supplied data (a
tautology), and must instead durably attribute the claim to an accountable
party so the claim's truth remains an explicit, auditable downstream
responsibility. The same principle was later reapplied to E04 (ADR-0034).
Runtime materialization¶
The accepted runtime foundation is implemented under
quant_platform.operations.protection as: ProtectionUnitIdentity,
AcceptedReconstructionContract, ArtifactProtectionIdentity,
ArtifactVerificationEvidence, ArtifactAssessmentResult,
ProtectionObligationEvidence, ProtectionAssessment, assess_protection(),
ProtectionWriteAction, SafetyRelevanceAssertion,
ProtectionWriteAuthorization, authorize_protection_write().
Deterministic multi-failure precedence (most severe first) resolves mixed
per-artifact outcomes into one ProtectionState without silently picking an
optimistic state.
The implementation intentionally introduces no filesystem crawler, source registry, scheduler, deletion authority or generic plugin/provider framework.
Consequences¶
- K06 is frozen and complete for the bounded v1 protection-identity/
assessment runtime; K07 (tier relocation) and K08 (backup/restore) can
depend on its
ProtectionState/ProtectionAssessmentoutput. - K09 (retention/deletion) still requires its own restore-proof authority before any deletion decision; K06 grants no deletion authority itself.
- Accepted known limitation:
ProtectionObligationEvidence's obligation kind is not yet type-restricted to K06-owned concerns (accepted during issue #59 review, 2026-09-17) -- tracked as a documented limitation, not an unresolved bug, and left for a future narrowing pass once a second obligation kind actually exists to disambiguate against.
Acceptance evidence¶
Executable proof is in tests/test_operations_protection_v1.py.